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Abstract
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is towards the exporters. We show that the increased competition for skilled labor dampens
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ect of trade liberalization on sector{wide TFP and real income.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the impact of trade liberalization in a model where rms can choose their
factor intensities in production. As this choice aects their export{status, we analyze a selection
mechanism that complements the one highlighted by Melitz (2003) which works instead through
heterogeneity in total factor productivity (TFP). By doing so, we develop a theoretical framework
that can account for the large heterogeneity in factor intensities that has been identied in the
empirical literature.1 Importantly, our model helps also rationalizing the recent evidence suggesting
that the eects of trade liberalization on sector{wide TFP might only be moderate (Lawless and
Whelan 2008; Chen, Imbs, and Scott 2009).
We cast our discussion in a general equilibrium setting with one monopolistically competitive
sector in each country. Each rm produces a unique variety of a dierentiated nal good using skilled
and unskilled labor. Upon market entry, rms choose the factor share parameter characterizing their
CES production function and, afterwards, are randomly assigned a TFP level. Importantly, rms
nd it optimal to adopt dierent factor intensities to limit competition in factor markets. Our
analysis starts by characterizing the autarkic equilibrium. Next, we study the trade equilibrium
arising in a symmetric N{country world. In a setting with xed export costs, and in which skilled
labor intensive rms are more likely to serve the foreign market, we show that the rm selection
induced by trade liberalization works along two dimensions.
First, more intense competition in factor markets induced by the additional production required
to serve the export markets increases the relative price of skilled labor. This has a negative eect on
those rms that use this factor intensively, and a positive one on unskilled labor intensive rms and
this eect becomes stronger, the larger is the dierence in factor intensities between the two types
of rms. As a result, some of the skilled labor intensive rms might be forced to cease production.
Second, within each of the two types of rms with the same factor input choice, we observe a
selection against the non{exporters, as in Melitz (2003). While the latter process increases sector{
wide TFP, the rst one has a priori an ambiguous eect. Still, under some mild assumptions, we
show that the larger is the dierence in factor intensities between rms, the smaller is the increase
in sector{wide TFP induced by trade liberalization. Thus, factor market competition dampens the
positive eect of trade on sector{wide TFP and on the change in real income.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on trade with rm heterogeneity, which has been pio-
neered by Bernard, Eaton, Kortum, and Jensen (2003) and Melitz (2003). Bernard et al. (2007)
extend the Melitz (2003) setup by considering two factors of production and, additionally, two mo-
nopolistically competitive sectors with dierent capital{labor ratios in production. As a result, they
are able to provide important insights into the inter{industry and intra{industry factor realloca-
tions induced by trade liberalization. At the same time, in their model rms are homogeneous with
1See Bernard and Jensen (1995) for the United States, Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for Chile, Munch and Skaksen
(2008) for Denmark, Wagner (2010) and Klein, Moser, and Urban (2013) for Germany and Martins and Opromolla
(2011) for Portugal among many others.
2For recent alternative explanations on the moderate TFP impact of trade liberalization see Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) or Ra and Wagner (2010).
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respect to factor intensities within each sector and a firm’s export status only depends on its TFP.
Thus, they do not analyze how firm heterogeneity in factor intensities interacts with globalization.
In Yeaple (2005), firms choose instead their technology upon market entry. Labor is the only factor
of production, but workers differ in their skills and for each technology, a higher skill level is assumed
to lead to higher revenues per worker. Similarly, a more advanced technology also leads to higher
revenues for any given skill level of the employee. Because of this monotone relationship, trade
liberalization generates the same type of firm selection as in Melitz (2003): the relative mass of
exporters increases, whereas the relative mass of non–exporters decreases. In our setup, on the
other hand, firms produce with standard CES technologies with two inputs, and for this reason we
do not have a monotone relationship between factor intensities and profits. While the paper by
Yeaple (2005) provides important insights on how trade liberalization affects workers’ skill–premia,
it does not consider firm heterogeneity in factor intensities and thus it cannot explain those stylized
facts about trade liberalization, which refer to factor market competition.
The papers that come closest to ours are Emami Namini (2014), Crozet and Trionfetti (2011)
and Furusawa and Sato (2008). All of these contributions develop models of trade in which firms
within the same sector differ in factor intensities. Emami Namini (2014) considers a setting in
which the factor intensity parameter is randomly assigned to firms and studies the impact of trade
liberalization on welfare and growth. Because of the randomness of the technology assignment, the
relative mass of firms with different factor intensities is given exogenously, whereas the study of
the effect of trade liberalization on firm selection is the focus of this paper. Crozet and Trionfetti
(2011) also consider a model with random factor intensities and study how a firm’s technology and
a country’s relative factor endowment interact to determine a firm’s sales volume. Furusawa and
Sato (2008) assume instead a random TFP parameter like in Melitz (2003) and a technology in
which a continuum of intermediate inputs, which differ in their factor intensities, is used to produce
a final good. Their focus is on the effects of trade liberalization on the adoption of a new technology
for the intermediate good and like in Crozet and Trionfetti (2011), Furusawa and Sato (2008) do
not consider the effect of the heterogeneity in factor intensities on firm selection.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lies out our model, whereas in
section 3 we characterize the autarkic equilibrium. In section 4 we solve for the open economy
equilibrium in a symmetric N–country setting, and in section 5 we study how trade liberalization
impacts sector–wide TFP and real income. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model setup
Home’s economy is populated by a continuum of households of unit mass and has a single mo-
nopolistically competitive industry. We start by describing the demand side, and proceed then to
consider production, focusing on the technologies available to the firms and on market entry.
3Our analysis is also related to the vast body of literature that has studied the link between globalization and
wage inequality. For a recent survey, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
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The preferences of the representative household are given by a CES utility function of the type
U =
Z
2
q()
 1
 d
 
 1
; (1)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between dierent varieties, and  is the set of available
varieties q(), indexed by . Each household is endowed with xed amounts of skilled and unskilled
labor, respectively denoted by S and L. The country's aggregate factor income is given by:
Y = wSS + wLL;
where wS and wL are respectively the returns to skilled and unskilled labor and S and L the
aggregate factor supplies.4 The aggregate demand for each individual variety is given by:
q() = Y P  1p() ; (2)
where P =
R
2 p()
1 d
 1
1  is the price index, which is dual to the utility function, and p()
the price of variety q().
Turning to the supply side of the economy, there is a continuum of identical potential entrants,
each of which can produce a dierent variety of the same good, combining skilled and unskilled
labor according to a CES technology. Firms start by choosing the parameter i 2 fL; Sg, with
S > L, determining the factor intensities in production. Next, to actually enter the market, we
follow Melitz (2003) and assume that rms pay a sunk market entry fee fE, which allows them to
draw a TFP parameter A from a common and exogenously given Pareto distribution with support
[1;1) and cumulative density G(A) = 1   A k, k >    1.5 Since the random TFP parameter
reects a rm's uncertainty about, e.g., how well workers perform, it is reasonable to assume that
a rm learns its TFP after it has chosen its skilled labor share parameter. A rm's  and TFP
parameter remain xed thereafter, but a rm faces a constant and exogenous death probability ,
0 <  < 1, forcing it to exit the market.6 The production function of a rm with skilled labor share
4Note that we are assuming each household, which we index with ,  2 B, to supply S and L units of the inputs.
Aggregate factor supplies are thus given by
R
2B Sd = S and
R
2B Ld = L.
5We assume that both skilled and unskilled labor intensive rms draw their TFP parameter from the same
distribution to separately capture the eects of heterogeneity in factor intensities and TFP. In a recent paper Harrigan
and Reshe (2011) consider instead a setting in which skill intensity is strongly positively correlated with TFP, and
trade liberalization induces a rm selection process that is very similar to that identied in Melitz (2003). We
will show later that the assumption k >    1 for the shape parameter k is necessary for the equilibrium to exist.
Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007), amongst others, have shown that a Pareto distribution describes appropriately
the distribution of TFP across rms in manufacturing.
6As in Melitz (2003), we will focus only on steady state equilibria. Moreover we assume that households do not
discount the future and that there are no savings opportunities in the economy. The constant death probability
implies a constant rm turnover and a constant amount of sunk entry costs in each instant of time in the steady
state.
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parameter i is given by:
qi(A) = A

1 i (Si
S)
 + (1  i)1  (Li
L)
 1
 ;  < 1; (3)
where qi(A) is the rm's output, Si and Li are the inputs of skilled and unskilled labor of rm i,
and 
S and 
L are factor specic productivity parameters. As a result, Si
S and Li
L denote the
eective units of factor inputs, and we assume 
S > 1 and 
L = 1 to capture the idea that one unit
of skilled labor is more productive than one unit of unskilled labor.7 The elasticity of substitution
between inputs is given by  = 1
1  > 0.
8 Based on the empirical literature, we will assume  >  in
the remainder of the analysis, i.e. that varieties are closer substitutes in consumption than factors
in production.9
The marginal cost ci(A) of a rm with factor share parameter i is given by:
ci(A) =
1
A
"
i

wS

S
1 
+ (1  i)w1 L
# 1
1 
;  > 0:
Clearly, if wS

S
6= wL, dierent values of  lead to dierent marginal costs, and if wS
S < wL, cS(A) <
cL(A), and viceversa. Production also requires a xed cost which takes the following form:
F Pi = Aci(A)f
P
i =
"
i

wS

S
1 
+ (1  i)w1 L
# 1
1 
fPi ; i = S; L:
Thus, as in Melitz (2003), we assume that TFP does not inuence the xed production cost F Pi .
The structure we have chosen for the xed cost is common in the literature and implies that the
latter is expressed in terms of output that must be produced, but which ultimately cannot be sold
(see Yeaple 2005). We assume that fPi > f
P
j if i > j, i.e. that the xed input requirement is
higher the more skilled labor intensive is the technology. This captures for instance the idea that
more skill intensive rms tend to spend more in R&D investment (see also Long, Ra, and Stahler
2011). To simplify the algebra, we assume that the sunk market entry fee fE is also expressed in
terms of a rm's output, i.e. the sunk market entry cost is given by FEi = Aci(A)f
E.
Finally, a rm's prots are given by: i (A) =
Y pi(A)
1 
P 1   Aci (A) fPi : Prot maximization leads
to the following pricing rule: pi(A) =

 1 ci(A):
7We thank one of the referees for suggesting this normalization.
8Note that in the representative consumer's utility function (equation 1) each variety receives an identical weight,
regardless of its factor intensities in production. While we could assume that, e.g., varieties with a higher skilled
labor intensity get a larger weight in utility (e.g., Haruyama and Zhao 2008), this would not add to our analysis of
the factor market eect of trade liberalization, while complicating the algebra.
9Typical estimates for  report values around 4 (e.g., Broda and Weinstein 2006), whereas point estimates for 
average around 1 (Antras 2004).
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3 Autarkic equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the autarkic equilibrium in the Home country, which is characterized
by the following set of equations:
i) production (equation 3) equals demand (equation 2) for each variety at the price pi(A), i = S; L;
ii) two zero cuto prot conditions for the supply to the domestic market (one for the skilled, one
for the unskilled labor intensive technology);
iii) two free entry conditions (one for the skilled, one for the unskilled labor intensive technology);
iv) two factor market clearing conditions.
Choosing unskilled labor as the numeraire (wL = 1), these equations can be solved for the autarkic
equilibrium (subscript a) values of: the average TFP parameters eAa;i i = L; S, the relative price of
skilled labor wa;S, the mass a;i of each type of rm i = L; S, and the output of each variety qi(A).
We start by determining the minimum productivity level Aa;i, such that a rm of type i actually
starts production after market entry. This is done by setting i (A) = 0, which results in the
following zero cuto prot condition:
Y P  1pi
 
Aa;i
 
= Aa;i(   1)fPi ; i = S; L: (4)
Assuming an innite time horizon for potential entrants, free entry drives the ex{ante expected
prots from market entry to zero, which implies:

1 G(Aa;i)
 " 1X
t=0
(1  )t
Z 1
Aa;i
i(A)a;i(A)dA
#
= FEi ; where a;i(A) =
g(A)
1 G(Aa;i)
: (5)
The rst term in squared brackets on the left hand side represents the probability that a rm of
type i starts producing after entry. The second term in squared brackets represents the expected
lifetime prots, given that market entry has been successful. The term (1 )t accounts for the risk
of death in each period, and t is a time index. The term on the right hand side represents instead
the sunk entry cost. We now combine the zero cuto prot condition with the free entry condition
to characterize the threshold TFP parameter in the autarkic equilibrium:10
Lemma 1 The threshold TFP parameter in the autarkic equilibrium is given by:
Aa;i =

fPi
fE
   1
k + 1  
 1
k
; i = S; L:
10Note that we do not include any time index in the following equations since we focus only on steady state
equilibria in which all sector{wide variables are constant.
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Proof. See appendix A.
We can introduce now the price of skilled labor (PS) equation, which results from taking the ratio
of the two zero cuto prot conditions (see equation 4) and determines the relative price of skilled
labor, given that both types of rms are active:
wa;S = 
S

	a (1  L)  (1  S)
S  	aL
 1
1 
; where 	a 

fPS
fPL
 1

 
Aa;S
Aa;L
! (1 )(1 )
 
: (6)
Substituting Aa;S and A

a;L from lemma 1 into equation 6, we can solve for wa;S.
11
In equilibrium factor markets clear. Applying Shephard's Lemma to the marginal cost functions
leads to:
L =
X
i=L;S
i
Z 1
Aa;i
aLi(A)
h
qi(A) + A bfa;iia;i(A)dA (7)
S =
X
i=L;S
i
Z 1
Aa;i
aSi(A)
h
qi(A) + A bfa;iia;i(A)dA; (8)
where aLi(A)  A 1 (1  i) ci(A) and aSi(A)  A 1iw S 
 1S ci(A) are, respectively, the per
unit skilled and unskilled labor requirements for variety i, and bfa;i  fE1 G(Aa;i) + fPi , i.e. i bfa;i
denotes total xed input requirements of rms of type i in general equilibrium.12
Using the free entry condition and substituting qi(A) from equation 2 into equations 7 and 8
and taking their ratio, we obtain the relative factor market clearing (FMC) equation:
L
S
w a;S

 1
S =
(1  S) + (1  L)
eA 1a;LeA 1a;S LS
"
L

wa;S

S
1 
+1 L
S

wa;S

S
1 
+1 S
# 
1 
S + L
eA 1a;LeA 1a;S LS
"
L

wa;S

S
1 
+1 L
S

wa;S

S
1 
+1 S
# 
1 
; (9)
where eAa;i  hR1Aa;i A 1a;i(A)dAi 1 1 is the average TFP parameter of all active rms of type i
in the autarkic equilibrium. Since
eA 1a;LeA 1a;S and wa;S are already known, we can solve equation 9 for
a;L
a;S
. Using either of the two zero cuto prot conditions, we can then determine a;S and a;L.
Once eAa;S, eAa;L, wa;S, a;S and a;L are known, we can solve for qi(A), i = S; L and establish the
following:
Proposition 1 If 1 S
1 L <

fPS
fPL
 ( 1)(k+1 )
k
< S
L
there exists a unique autarkic equilibrium with both
11For wa;S to be dened, the term in squared brackets on the right hand side of equation 6 must be positive. See
proposition 1 for the exact parametric restrictions required.
12Note that, if bi rms of type i have entered the market, i  [1 G(Aa;i)]bi actually become active. Furthermore,
since in the steady state a share  of active rms is replaced by new rms in each instant of time, the total sunk
market entry requirements for rms of type i are given by i bfi.
6
6-
L
S
wS
PSa
FMCa
Ea
-
6L
S
Ea
a;L
a;S
Zero prot
condition
Figure 1: Autarkic equilibrium
skilled and unskilled labor intensive rms active in the market. Otherwise, a unique equilibrium
exists with only skilled or only unskilled labor intensive rms active.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the remainder of the analysis we will assume that i and f
P
i , i = S; L, are such that both skilled
and unskilled labor intensive rms are active in equilibrium.13 Substituting Aa;i (see lemma 1) into
equation 6 then yields
wa;S

S
< 1. As a result, cS(A) < cL(A) for any given A, i.e. the marginal cost
of a skilled labor intensive rm must be lower than the marginal cost of an unskilled labor intensive
rm. Intuitively, entrants will choose the skilled labor intensive technology with higher xed costs
only if they are compensated by a lower marginal cost.
In the left panel of Figure 1, we depict the PS and FMC curve. Their intersection establishes
the relative price of skilled labor wS and the relative mass of unskilled labor intensive rms
L
S
in
the autarkic equilibrium. Once the relative mass of unskilled labor intensive rms
a;L
a;S
is known
(see the upward sloping line in the right panel), we can obtain the absolute number of rms by
using one of the two zero cuto prot conditions.
4 Open economy equilibrium
In this section, we extend our analysis to a setting with N symmetric countries to study the eect of
a move from autarky to an open economy equilibrium in the presence of variable and xed export
costs. The subscript \op" denotes variables in the open economy equilibrium, and our analysis
focuses on a representative country.
The new equilibrium is characterized by the same equations that describe the autarkic equilib-
rium (see section 3), with the addition of two zero cuto prot conditions for the supply to the
13The analysis with a single type of rm would be comparable to the one in Melitz (2003).
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foreign market (one for the skilled, one for the unskilled labor intensive technology). Using these
conditions we can determine: the average TFP parameters A˜op,i for the two types of firms, the
relative price of skilled labor wop,S, the mass ηop,i and the share of exporters sX,i among the two
types of firms and, finally, the aggregate production of each variety.
Let τ ≥ 1 be an iceberg transportation cost common to all varieties. Utility maximization
abroad results in foreign demand for a domestic variety given by: qX,i(A) = Y P
ξ−1pi(A)−ξτ 1−ξ,
where pi(A) is the producer price. Thus, the aggregate output of an exporting firm is given by:[
1 + (N − 1)τ 1−ξ] qi(A) = [1 + (N − 1)τ 1−ξ]Y P ξ−1pi(A)−ξ, N ≥ 2. (10)
In order to export, we assume that a firm must set up a distribution network, which leads to a fixed
export cost given by FX,i = Aci(A)fX , i.e. TFP also does not influence the fixed export cost.
In the open economy equilibrium, we have to consider two threshold parameters for TFP for each
type of firm. The first one, denoted by A∗op,i, identifies the marginal firm supplying the domestic
market, and it is the solution to the zero cutoff profit condition described in equation 4. The second
one is denoted by A∗X,i and characterizes the minimum productivity level that enables a firm to
serve the N − 1 foreign markets profitably. This threshold is determined from the following zero
cutoff profit condition:
Y P ξ−1pi(A∗X,i)
−ξτ 1−ξ = qX,i(A∗X,i) = A
∗
X,i(ξ − 1)fX . (11)
Equation 11 implies that A∗X,L > A
∗
X,S, i.e. unskilled labor intensive firms need a higher TFP level
to export, as compared to skilled labor intensive firms. Intuitively, a higher TFP is needed to
compensate for the otherwise higher marginal cost of unskilled labor intensive firms.
Finally, dividing equations 4 and 11 by each other and solving for A∗X,i yields:
A∗X,i = A
∗
op,iτ
(
fPi
fX
) 1
1−ξ
, i = S, L. (12)
Following Melitz (2003), we will assume that τ ξ−1fX ≥ fPi . As a result, A∗X,i ≥ A∗op,i, i.e. not all
firms necessarily export in the open economy equilibrium.
The free entry condition has to be modified to account for the additional ex–ante expected
export profits, and can be written as:
∞∑
t=0
(1− θ)t
[∫ ∞
A∗op,i
pii(A)µop,i(A)dA+ (N − 1)sX,i
∫ ∞
A∗X,i
piX,i(A)µX,i(A)dA
]
=
FEi
1−G(A∗op,i)
, (13)
where µop,i(A) =
g(A)
1−G(A∗op,i) , sX,i =
1−G(A∗X,i)
1−G(A∗op,i) and µX,i(A) =
g(A)
1−G(A∗X,i) . The term 1 − G(A
∗
X,i)
denotes the probability that a firm of type i exports after market entry, and
∫∞
A∗X,i
piX,i(A)µX,i(A)dA
is the average export profits of exporting firms. The following result characterizes the threshold
TFP parameter for each type of firm in the open economy equilibrium and the impact of trade
8
liberalization on it:
Lemma 2 The open economy threshold TFP parameter is Aop;i =
"
(fPi )
k+1 
1  +N 1
k
f
k+1 
1 
X
(fPi )
k
1  fE
 1
k+1 
# 1
k
,
i = S; L. Trade liberalization increases Ai , and the increase is larger, the less restricted is trade
(i.e. the smaller are  and fX).
14 Furthermore, trade liberalization increases
AS
AL
.
Proof. See appendix C.
To understand the intuition behind lemma 2, note that trade liberalization increases ex{ante ex-
pected prots from market entry and thus triggers additional entry of both skilled and unskilled
labor intensive rms. Competition becomes stronger, which implies that only the more productive
rms of each type will survive. Since the share of exporters among skilled labor intensive rms is
larger, i.e. sX;S > sX;L, new entry of skilled labor intensive rms exceeds new entry of unskilled
labor intensive rms. Thus, the average productivity increase among skilled labor intensive rms
is larger than that among unskilled labor intensive rms.
The relative price of skilled labor in the open economy equilibrium can be derived by taking
the ratio of the zero cuto prot conditions for the supply to the export market (equation 11),
considering equation 12 and then solving for wop;S:
wop;S = 
S

	op (1  L)  (1  S)
S  	opL
 1
1 
; with 	op =

fPS
fPL
 1

 
Aop;S
Aop;L
! (1 )(1 )
 
: (14)
Equation 14 shows that wop;S > wa;S, i.e. trade liberalization shifts the PS{curve upward.
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Since rms can now also export, the factor market clearing conditions become:
L=
X
i=L;S
i
(Z 1
Aop;i
aLi(A)
h
qi(A) + A bfop;iiop;i(A)dA+Z 1
AX;i
aLi(A)[qX;i(A) + AfX ] sX;i(N   1)X;i(A)dA
)
(15)
S=
X
i=L;S
i
(Z 1
Aop;i
aSi(A)
h
qi(A) + A bfop;iiop;i(A)dA+Z 1
AX;i
aSi(A)[qX;i(A) + AfX ] sX;i(N   1)X;i(A)dA
)
;
(16)
where bfop;i  fE1 G(Aop;i) + fPi . Substituting domestic and foreign demands into equations 15 and 16
14The same result holds if the number N of trading partners increases.
15Remember that from lemma 2 we have
Aop;S
Aop;L
>
Aa;S
Aa;L
. Thus, if  > 1, 	op < 	a and
@wS
@	 < 0, and if  < 1,
	op > 	a and
@wS
@	 > 0. Finally, for wop;S to be dened, the term in squared brackets on the right hand side of
equation 14 must be positive. Thus, if  > 1 we must have SL > 	op and if  < 1 we must have 	op >
1 S
1 L (see
appendix B for the same argument concerning wa;S). Since trade liberalization increases
AS
AL
, we have 	op < 	a if
 > 1 and 	op > 	a if  < 1. Thus, the same parametric restrictions which are necessary for wa;S to be dened (see
proposition 1), also imply that wop;S is dened.
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and taking their ratio results in:
L
S
w op;S

 1
S =
(1  S) + (1  L)
eA 1op;LeA 1op;S LS LS
"
L

wop;S

S
1 
+1 L
S

wop;S

S
1 
+1 S
# 
1 
S + L
eA 1op;LeA 1op;S LS LS
"
L

wop;S

S
1 
+1 L
S

wop;S

S
1 
+1 S
# 
1 
; (17)
where i  1 + (N 1)sX;i 1
eA 1X;ieA 1op;i . eAX;ihR1AX;iA 1X;i(A)dAi 1 1 and eAop;ihR1Aop;iA 1op;i(A)dAi 1 1
are respectively the average TFP parameter of exporting and all active rms of type i in the open
economy equilibrium. Comparing the right hand sides of equations 9 and 17, note that trade
liberalization decreases eA 1L relative to eA 1S and LS < 1.16 Thus, for a given wS, LS must increase
after trade liberalization for factor markets to clear. This implies that trade liberalization shifts the
FMC{curve to the right. Summarizing our results so far we obtain:
Lemma 3 Compared to autarky, a multilateral trade liberalization has the following consequences:
i) exporting rms increase their production;
ii) the relative price of skilled labor wS increases since the share of exporters among skilled labor
intensive rms is larger than among unskilled labor intensive rms (sX;S > sX;L);
iii) the increase in wS ceteris paribus decreases (increases) the ex{ante expected prots from choos-
ing the skilled (unskilled) labor intensive technology.
Proof. See appendix D.
Our analysis so far suggests that the eect of trade liberalization on rm selection is in general
ambiguous, i.e. we do not know whether L
S
increases or decreases. The additional availability
of foreign varieties adversely aects both skilled and unskilled labor intensive rms. At the same
time, the increased prot opportunities abroad aect the average skilled labor intensive rm more
positively than the average unskilled labor intensive rm. Finally, the increased competition in
factor markets, which is reected by the rightward shift of the FMC{curve, aects skilled labor
intensive rms negatively and unskilled labor intensive rms positively.
The net eect of trade liberalization on the two types of rms crucially depends on the factor
intensity gap, i.e. on the dierence in the skilled labor share parameters S  L, which determines
(i) the extent to which wS increases with trade liberalization and (ii) the extent to which rms are
aected by the increase in wS. Its role is characterized in the following:
16Due to our distributional assumption for A, we have eAi = Ai  kk+1  1 1 . Thus, as ASAL increases with trade
liberalization (see lemma 2),
eASeAL increases as well. LS is smaller than 1 since sX;L
eA 1X;LeA 1op;L < sX;S
eA 1X;SeA 1op;S , which can be
transformed to

AX;L
Aop;L
 1 k
<

AX;S
Aop;S
 1 k
, due to our distributional assumption for A. Since
AX;i
Aop;i
= 

fPi
fX
 1
1 
,
the latter condition can be transformed to
 
fPL
  1 k
1  <
 
fPS
  1 k
1  , which holds since fPL < f
P
S and
 1 k
1  > 0.
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
S   L
1(S   L)min
op;L
op;S
  a;L
a;S
Figure 2: The role of the factor intensity gap
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold value for the factor intensity gap, denoted by , such that
if S   L > (<)  trade liberalization increases (decreases) the relative mass of unskilled labor
intensive rms L
S
. Furthermore, the larger is S   L, the more detrimental (benecial) is trade
liberalization for skilled (unskilled) labor intensive rms.
Proof. See appendix E.
Figure 2 illustrates the result.
op;L
op;S
stands for the relative mass of unskilled labor intensive rms
in the open economy equilibrium, while
a;L
a;S
stands for the relative mass of unskilled labor inten-
sive rms in the autarkic equilibrium. The minimum factor intensity gap, which is denoted by
(S   L)min, is dened as that dierence S   L, which leads to a;S = 0.17
The intuition behind proposition 2 is as follows. First, the increase in the relative price of skilled
labor wS due to trade liberalization is larger, the larger is the dierence S   L. Second, for a
given increase in wS, the losses (gains) for the skilled (unskilled) labor intensive rms are larger,
the larger is S   L. Thus, if the factor intensity gap is suciently large, unskilled (skilled) labor
intensive rms will gain (lose) from trade liberalization and will enter (exit) the market.
Figure 3 illustrates the eect of trade liberalization on the mass of rms active in equilibrium.
The left panel shows that, starting from the autarkic equilibrium Ea, trade liberalization shifts the
PS{curve upward. This results from the increase in AS relative to A

L (see lemma 2) due to trade
liberalization, which requires an increase in the relative price of skilled labor wS for the zero cuto
prot conditions to hold again.18 Trade liberalization also increases competition in factor markets,
which shifts the FMC{curve rightward. In fact, if the relative demand for skilled labor increases,
L
S
has to increase for any given wS to re{establish factor market clearing. The open economy
17See appendix E for a formal proof that the relationship between
op;L
op;S
  a;La;S and S   L is monotonically
increasing.
18Note that an increase in wS increases
pS(A)
pL(A)
, which shifts demand from skilled to unskilled labor intensive rms.
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Figure 3: Trade liberalization
equilibrium is illustrated by point Eop. Note that we have drawn the curves for a \large" factor
intensity gap, such that L
S
increases with trade liberalization.
The right panel of the same gure illustrates also the role played by the increased availability of
foreign varieties. Starting from the autarkic equilibrium Ea, holding factor prices constant, increased
availability of foreign varieties and new prot opportunities abroad make the line illustrating the zero
cuto prot condition for skilled labor intensive rms shift inward and become steeper. Allowing
factor prices to adjust (wS increases) attens the curve and makes it shift inward.
19 The new
equilibrium point is indicated by Eop. In general, the mass of skilled labor intensive rms S
decreases, whereas L can increase or decrease.
Finally, note that in our model the increased factor market competition, reected by the shift
of the FMC{curve, does not induce a skill intensive exporting rm to become a non{exporter and
stay active.20 This is because the resulting increase in wS negatively impacts both prots from
serving the domestic market and prots from exporting. Thus, an increase in wS does not induce
the marginal skill intensive exporter to become a non{exporter.21 Instead, it induces fewer (more)
rms to choose the skill (unskill) intensive technology upon market entry.
5 Average TFP and real income
We turn now to consider how trade liberalization aects productivity and welfare. We start by
focusing on average productivity. In particular, we measure productivity at the factory gate, i.e.
19Still, the zero cuto prot condition in the open economy equilibrium is steeper than the one in the autarkic
equilibrium. Appendix F formally derives the shift of the zero cuto prot condition.
20This result follows, of course, from our focus on steady states. It is well{known that, in the short run, rms also
enter and exit the export market without necessarily dying, as pointed out by Schroder and Srensen (2012).
21Remember that Aop;i (lemma 2) and A

i;X (equation 12) are independent of wS .
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we use an output weighted measure dened as follows:
eA = eASS + eALL; (18)
where S and L are the share of GDP respectively produced by skilled and unskilled labor intensive
rms and eAi is the average TFP parameter of rms of type i, i = S; L.22 The eect of trade
liberalization on average productivity is characterized in the following:
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization increases sector{wide average productivity, and this increase is
larger, the less restricted trade becomes. This increase is smaller, the larger is the factor intensity
gap S   L.
Proof. See appendix G.
The intuition for this result is as follows: on the one hand, the less restricted trade becomes, i.e. if
 and fX decrease, the larger is the increase in A

i (see lemma 2). On the other hand, the share of
exporters among the skill intensive rms is larger than among the unskill intensive ones. Thus, trade
liberalization not only increases eAS, eAL and eAS relative to eAL, but it ceteris paribus also increases
S relative to L. However, as shown by proposition 2, the factor intensity gap determines whether
L
S
increases or decreases with trade liberalization. If S   L is large, the increased factor market
competition (rightward shift of the FMC-curve in Figure 3) dominates the impact of increased
prot opportunities abroad (upward shift of the PS-curve), so that L increases relative to S. If
this is the case, the relative frequency of those rms, which experience a larger increase in their
average TFP, decreases. This dampens the positive eect of trade liberalization on sector{wide
TFP.
The theoretical analyses that have built upon Melitz's (2003) model have emphasized the positive
TFP eect of trade liberalization. At the same time, recent empirical evidence (Lawless and Whelan
2008; Chen, Imbs, and Scott 2009) points out that these eects might be only moderate. Our
analysis suggests that, in the presence of substantial heterogeneity in factor intensities, the increase
in factor market competition actually dampens the increase in average TFP brought about by trade
liberalization, by forcing some of the skilled labor intensive rms out of the market.23 Looking at
factor markets is thus crucial to gain a more nuanced understanding of the rm selection process
and of its consequences.
We turn next to study the eect of trade on real income, which is done in the following:
Proposition 4 Trade liberalization increases real income, and this increase is larger, the less re-
stricted trade becomes. The increase in real income is smaller, the larger is the factor intensity gap
S   L.
Proof. See appendix H.
22See appendix G for the derivation of S and L used for the computation of eA.
23For empirical evidence on this point see Emami Namini, Facchini, and Lopez (2013).
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To understand this result, note that trade liberalization increases the mass of available varieties,
which decreases the aggregate price index and thus insures that real income increases. As trade
becomes less restricted, i.e. as  and fX decrease, the TFP gains from trade liberalization become
larger (see lemma 2), which implies that the increase in real income becomes larger as well. At
the same time, the increased factor market competition due to trade liberalization hurts the skill
intensive rms, which are those that supply at a lower price and are more likely to export. Thus, a
larger factor intensity gap implies a smaller rise in real income since it makes the increase in factor
market competition more detrimental for skill intensive rms.
6 Conclusions
A large empirical literature has shown that exporting and non{exporting rms dier not only in
their TFP, but also in the mix of inputs used in production, even within narrowly dened sectors.
In this paper, we have developed a new theoretical framework to analyze how these two sources of
heterogeneity aect the rm selection process brought about by trade liberalization.
In a setting in which exporters are more productive than non{exporters and in which skill in-
tensive rms are more likely to export, we have shown that the rm selection induced by trade
liberalization works along two dimensions. First, more intense competition in factor markets in-
duced by the additional production needed to export increases the relative price of skilled labor,
negatively aecting those rms that use this input intensively, while positively aecting unskilled
labor intensive rms. This eect becomes stronger, the larger is the dierence in factor intensities
between the two types of rms. As a result, some of the skill intensive rms might be forced to
cease production and exit. Second, within each type of rms, we observe selection against the
non{exporters, as in Melitz (2003). While the second process increases sector{wide TFP, the rst
one has a priori an ambiguous eect. Still, under some mild assumptions, we have established that
the larger is the dierence in the skill intensity between rms, the smaller is the increase in sector{
wide TFP induced by a trade expansion. In other words, factor market competition dampens the
positive eect of trade on sector{wide TFP and on the increase in real income. Our analysis thus
suggests that to fully understand the welfare implications of trade liberalization, competition in
factor markets should be taken into account.
Our research can be extended to tackle several additional important questions. First, we could
consider a model with multiple sectors with dierences in factor intensities both within and across
industries and Heckscher{Ohlin trade. In this context we could study whether reallocations within
sectors can dominate reallocations between sectors, so that even the unskilled labor abundant
country might experience an increase in country{wide skilled labor intensity following a trade lib-
eralization. Secondly, it would be interesting to carry out a quantitative exploration of the eects
of factor market competition on the gains from trade within our model. While both these questions
are important, they are left for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of lemma 1
Substituting the expression for i(A) into equation 5, using the marginal cost function ci(A) and
the formula for an innite geometric series, the free entry condition can be rewritten as follows:
qi( eAa;i)
(   1) eAa;i = f
E
1 G  Aa;i + fPi ; where eAa;i =
"Z 1
Aa;i
A 1a;i(A)dA
# 1
 1
: (19)
Since
qi(Aa;i)
qi( eAa;i) =
 eAa;i
Aa;i
 
, equation 4 implies that qi( eAa;i) =  eAa;iAa;i Aa;i(   1)fPi . Substituting
qi( eAa;i) into equation 19 and recalling that A follows a Pareto distribution, we can determine Aa;i.
Note that the assumption k >    1 is necessary for Aa;i to be dened.
B Proof of proposition 1
wS is dened for all possible values of  only if
(1 L)

fPS
fP
L
 1


Aa;S
A
a;L
 (1 )( 1)
  (1 S)
S L

fP
S
fP
L
 1   Aa;S
A
a;L
 (1 )(1 )  > 0 (see equation
6). Since S
L
> 1 S
1 L , the numerator and the denominator have the same sign only if they are both
positive. Using the solution for Aa;i from lemma 1, this is true if the following conditions hold: (i)
1 S
1 L <

fPS
fPL
 ( 1)(k+1 )
k
; (ii)

fPS
fPL
 ( 1)(k+1 )
k
< S
L
. Condition (i) holds if  > 1, while condition
(ii) holds if  < 1.
To establish existence, substitute wa;S from equation 6 into the right hand side of equation 9
and solve for
a;L
a;S
to obtain:
a;L
a;S
=
1 S
w a;S

 1
S S
  L
S
L
S
  1 L
w a;S

 1
S L
S
L
	
 
1 
aeA 1a;LeA 1a;S
> 0: (20)
To understand why
a;L
a;S
> 0, note that 1 S
w a;S

 1
S S
is the relative unskilled labor demand by skilled
labor intensive rms, while 1 L
w a;S

 1
S L
is the relative unskilled labor demand by unskilled labor
intensive rms (remember the derivation of the factor input coecients in equations 7 and 8).
While the former is smaller than L
S
, the latter is larger than L
S
.
To establish uniqueness, we totally dierentiate equation 9 with respect to wS and
L
S
and
solve for dwS
d(
L
S
)
to obtain: dwS
d(
L
S
)
=
 (S L) eA 1a;S cS( eAa;S)  eA 1a;L cL( eAa;L) wS
1 S 2S
w 1S
L
S
+(S L)2 eA2( 1)a;L cL( eAa;L)2  1L eA2( 1)a;S cS( eAa;S)2  1S( ) , with
 
hP
i=S;L i
eA 1a;i ci( eAa;i) ii2. dwSd( L
S
)
< 0 since S   L > 0 and     > 0 by assumption.
Since the PS equation shows that wa;S in equilibrium is independent from
L
S
, while the FMC
equation implies a negative relationship between wS and
L
S
, it follows that the autarkic equilibrium
is unique.
If 1 S
1 L <

fPS
fPL
 ( 1)(k+1 )
k
< S
L
does not hold, there exists no wa;S that satises the zero
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cuto prot condition (equation 4) for the skilled and the unskilled labor intensive technology
simultaneously, i.e. only one technology is used in equilibrium in this case.
C Proof of lemma 2
Substituting the expressions for i(A) and X;i(A) into equation 13, using the marginal cost function
ci(A) and the formula for an innite geometric series, equation 13 can be rewritten as follows:
qi( eAop;i)
(   1) eAop;i + (N   1)sX;i
"
qi( eAX;i) 1 
(   1) eAX;i   fX
#
=
fE
1 G  Aa;i + fPi ; (21)
where eAop;i = hR1Aop;i A 1op;i(A)dAi 1 1 , eAX;i = hR1AX;i A 1X;i(A)dAi 1 1 and sX;i = 1 G(AX;i)1 G(Aop;i) .
Since
qi(Aop;i)
qi( eAop;i) =
 eAop;i
Aop;i
 
and
qi(AX;i)
qi( eAX;i) =
 eAX;i
AX;i
 
, the zero cuto prot conditions (equations 4 and
11) can be transformed to: qi( eAa;i) =  eAa;iAa;i Aa;i( 1)fPi and qi( eAX;i) 1  =  eAX;iAX;i AX;i( 1)fX .
Substituting these terms for qi( eAa;i) and qi( eAX;i), as well as AX;i (equation 12) into equation 21 and
recalling that A follows a Pareto distribution, equation 21 can be solved for Aop;i. The solution for
Aop;i shows the following: (i) A

op;i > A

a;i since k+1   > 0; (ii) Aop;i increases if  and fX become
smaller, or if N becomes larger. Finally, if we dene    N 1
kf
k+1 
 1
X
we can derive the following
partial derivative:
@
 
Aop;S=A

op;L

@ 
=
 
Aop;S
Aop;L
!1 k
(fPL )
k+1 
1    (fPS )
k+1 
1 
k
h
(fPL )
k+1 
1  +  
i2 (fPL ) k1 
(fPS )
k
1 
> 0
since fPS > f
P
L and
k+1 
1  < 0. Since   becomes larger if  or fX become smaller or if N becomes
larger, the ratio
Aop;S
Aop;L
increases with trade liberalization.
D Proof of lemma 3
Part (i) follows from equation 10, while part (ii) follows from equation 14. To prove part (iii),
note that the ex{ante expected per period prots expS (
eAop;S) from choosing a skilled labor intensive
technology are given by:
expS (
eAop;S) = 1 G(Aop;S)
"Z 1
Aop;S
S(A)op;S(A)dA+ (N   1)sX;S
Z 1
AX;S
X;S(A)X;S(A)dA
#
  FES :
(22)
Substituting the terms for S(A) and X;S(A) into equation 22 leads to:
expS (
eAop;S) = 1 G(Aop;S)
"
Y pS( eAop;S)1 
P  1
S   eAop;ScS( eAop;S)f 0S
#
; (23)
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with S  1 + N 1 1 sX;S
eA 1X;SeA 1op;S and f 0S  f
E
1 G(Aop;S) + f
P
S + sX;SfX . Considering that the aggregate
price index is given by P =
hP
i=S;L op;ipi(
eAop;i)1 ii 11  , we can now determine the partial
derivative
@expS (
eAop;S)
@wS
and consider afterwards that f 0S =
Y pS( eAop;S)
P 1  eAop;S( 1)S in the initial equilibrium
(see equation 13) to obtain:
@expS (
eAop;S)
@wS
=

S
L
  Sw S
1 S 

 1
S

(1 S)L
P  1  
Y (S L)w S
 1( 1)  LLcL(
eAL)  eA 1L 
 1SeA1 S cS( eAS) P 2(1 )(   1)1  1S : (24)
Since S
1 Sw
 
S 

 1
S denotes relative skilled labor demand by the skilled labor intensive rms we
can conclude that S
L
  S
1 Sw
 
S 

 1
S < 0. Furthermore, since S   L > 0, we get @
exp
S (
eAop;S)
@wS
< 0.
It can be shown along the same lines that expL (
eAL) increases with wS.
E Proof of proposition 2
The proof proceeds in four steps. First, the upward shift of the PS{curve becomes smaller, the
larger is S for any given level of L. This shift is reected by
wop;S
wa;S
, and it is easy to show that:
@

wop;S
wa;S

@S
=
(S  	opL) (S  	aL)

Lw
1 
op;Sw
1 
a;S + 1  L

wa;S
wop;S

1 
	a 	op f[	a(1  L)  (1  S)] [S  	opL]g
2
< 0
since 	a > 	op if  > 1, 	a < 	op if  < 1 and S  	L > 0 (see proposition 1).
Second, the rightward shift of the FMC{curve with trade liberalization does not depend on the
factor intensity gap. Solving equations 9 and 17 for
a;L
a;S
and
op;L
op;S
, and taking their ratio results in:
op;L=op;S
a;L=a;S
=
(1 S) LSw
 
op;S

 1
S S
L
S
w op;S

 1
S L (1 L)
"
S

wop;S

S
1 
+1 S
L

wop;S

S
1 
+1 L
# 
1   eAop;LeAop;S1  SL
1 S LSw
 
a;S

 1
S S
L
S
w a;S

 1
S L (1 L)
"
S

wa;S

S
1 
+1 S
L

wa;S

S
1 
+1 L
# 
1   eAa;LeAa;S1 
:
Thus, if we use the solutions for eAa;i and eAop;i, we can express op;L=op;Sa;L=a;S for a constant level of
wS = wop;S = wa;S:
op;L=op;S
a;L=a;S

wop;S=wa;S
=
26641 + N 1k

fPS
fX
 k+1 
 1
1 + N 1
k

fPL
fX
 k+1 
 1
3775
k+ 1
k
> 1 (25)
since k   + 1 > 0 and fPS > fPL . As a result, trade liberalization shifts the FMC{curve rightward,
and the magnitude of this shift does not depend on the factor intensity gap.
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Third, L
S
decreases with trade liberalization if the factor intensity gap is at its minimum level.
To derive the minimum factor intensity gap, note that
a;S
a;L
is given by:
a;S
a;L
=
L
S
w a;S

 1
S L   (1  L)
1  S   LSw a;S
 1S S
 eAa;LeAa;S
! 1 264S

wa;S

S
1 
+ 1  S
L

wa;S

S
1 
+ 1  L
375
 
1 
: (26)
Thus,
a;S
a;L
= 0 if L
S
w a;S

 1
S L   (1  L) = 0. Remember that wa;S (see equation 6) is a function
of S and L. Since
@wa;S
@S
=
wa;S

1 
(S 	aL)2
1 	a
1  > 0 (note that 	a > 1 if  > 1 and 	a < 1 if
 < 1) for each given level of L, there exists a unique S that leads to
a;S
a;L
= 0. Since the term
1 S   LSw a;S
 1S S on the right hand side of equation 26 is negative and since wS increases with
trade liberalization (see lemma 3), we can conclude that S
L
becomes strictly positive with trade
liberalization if the factor intensity gap is such that
a;S
a;L
= 0.
Finally, if the factor intensity gap is at its maximum, i.e. if S = 1 and L = 0, we get
a;S
a;L
=
SfPL
LfPS

S and
op;S
op;L
=
SfPL
LfPS

S
L
S
. Since L
S
=
1+N 1
k

fPL
fX
 k +1
 1
1+N 1
k

fP
S
fX
 k +1
 1
< 1 (remember that k+1  > 0
and fPS > f
P
L ),
S
L
decreases with trade liberalization if S = 1 and L = 0.
F The zero cuto prot condition in the right panel of gure 3
Let op1 denote and op2 denote respectively the open economy equilibrium before any adjustment
of relative factor prices and after it. The axis intercepts of the zero cuto prot condition of the
skilled labor intensive rms (see equation 4) in the right panel of gure 3 are given by:
a;S =

Y
pS(AS)A

S

a
k + 1  
k(   1)fPS
and a;L =

Y pL(A

L)
 1(AL)
 1
pS(AS)(A

S)


a
k + 1  
k(   1)

fPS
fPL
 1
k
fPS
:
Since P =
hP
i=S;L ipi(
eAi)1 ii 11  in the open economy equilibrium, the axis intercepts after
trade liberalization and before any adjustment of relative factor prices are given by:
op1;S =

Y pS(A

S)
 1
ASS

op1
k + 1  
k(   1)fPS
and op1;L =

Y pL(A

L)
 1(AL)
 1
pS(AS)(A

S)
L

op1
(k+1 )

fPL
fPS
 1
k
k(   1)fPS
:
Thus,
op1;i
a;i
= 1
i
, i = S; L and
op1;S
a;S
<
op1;L
a;L
since S > L. This implies that the zero cuto
prot condition becomes steeper and shifts inward (note that i > 1).
In order to determine how the increase in wS aects the S{axis intercept, we consider the
following partial derivative:
@

Y
pS(A

S
)A
S

@wS
=

S
L
  Sw S 
 1S
1 S

(1 S)L(AS)cS(AS)
pS(A

S)
2(AS)2( 1) < 0. Thus, we
obtain
h
Y
pS(A

S)A

S
i
op2
<
h
Y
pS(A

S)A

S
i
op1
, which implies op2;S < op1;S.
To determine how the increase in wS aects the L{axis intercept, rst note that the increase
in wS makes the zero cuto prot condition ceteris paribus atter since its slope is given by
dL
dS
=
18
 S
L
h
pS( eAS)
pL( eAL)
i1 
and
@[pS( eAS)=pL( eAL)]
@wS
> 0. Second, taking the ratio of the zero cuto prot conditions
of the two types of rms leads to:
h
pL(A

L)
pS(A

S)
i
=
ASf
P
S
ALf
P
L
. Thus, the L{axis intercepts become:
a;L =
24 Y (fPS )(fPL )
pL(AL)A

L
35
a
(k + 1  )

fPL
fPS
 1
k
k(   1)fPS
and op2;L =
24 Y (fPS )(fPL )
pL(AL)A

L
35
op2
(k + 1  )

fPL
fPS
 1
k
k(   1)fPS
:
It follows immediately that a;L < op2;L since
@

Y
pL(A

L
)A
L

@wS
> 0. Third, since the zero cuto prot
condition becomes atter as wS increases and since op2;S < op1;S, we have that op2;L < op1;L.
G Proof of proposition 3
Let j =
R1
A
j
qj(A)pj(A)j(A)dA+
R1
A
X;j
qX;j(A)pj(A)sX;jjX;j(A)dAP
i=L;S
R1
A
i
qi(A)pi(A)i(A)dA+
R1
A
X;i
qX;i(A)pi(A)sX;iiX(A)dA
 be the share of GDP produced by
rms using intensively factor j. Substituting the demand functions, the pricing condition and the
equilibrium value of wS into j we obtain:
j =
F
 1+k
k
j
 
fPj
 k
 1
F
 1+k
k
L
L
j
(fPL )
k
 1 + F
 1+k
k
S
S
j
(fPS )
k
 1
;
where Fj =
 
fPj
 k+1 
1  +  , j = S; L, and    N 1
kf
k+1 
 1
X
. Trade liberalization impacts Fj as well as
S
L
, and if the factor intensity gap is at its maximum, the impact on S
L
is most detrimental. Thus,
to prove proposition 3, we rst analyze how trade liberalization impacts L if S = 1 and L = 0.
Substituting S
L

S=1; L=0
into the term for L, we can determine the following partial derivative:
@L

S=1;L=0
@ 
=
h
(fPS )
k+1 
1    (fPL )
k+1 
1 
i
 1+2k
k
L
S

(fPS )
k
 1
(fPL )
k 1+
1 
2
F
 1+k
k
S F
 1+k
k
L
F
 1+2k
k
L (f
P
L )
2k
 1 + F
 1+2k
k
S (f
P
S )
2k
 1 L
S

 1S
2

1 S
< 0
since k + 1   > 0 and fPS > fPL . Thus, even when the rm selection is most in favor of unskilled
labor intensive rms, the weighting factor L decreases with trade liberalization, and the opposite
is true for S since S = 1   L. Thus, since eAS > eAL and since @ ~AS@  > @ ~AL@  (see lemma 2), eA =eALL + eASS increases with trade liberalization, even when the rm selection is most detrimental
for the skilled labor intensive rms. A fortiori the result is true if the factor intensity gap becomes
smaller, and the increase in eA becomes larger. Finally, as trade becomes less restricted, both eAL
and eAS increase, which increases eA.
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H Proof of proposition 4
Real income is given by: Y
P
= wSS+L
[
R
2 p(v)
1 d]
1
1 
. Note rst that any change in wS across trade equi-
libria does not impact real income. This follows immediately from calculating
@(YP )
@wS
and substituting
the equilibrium values for S
L
(see appendix E) and wS into the resulting term. As a consequence,
we will set wS equal to a constant level wS in the following. Solving equations 7 and 8 for a;L and
a;S and equations 15 and 16 for op;L and op;S and using the term for P yields: 
Y
P

op 
Y
P

a
=
"
(1  L) kk+1 fPL ( eAop;L)1  +fPS (1  S) kk+1  ( eAop;S)1 
(1  L) kk+1 fPL ( eAa;L)1  +fPS (1  S) kk+1  ( eAa;S)1 
# 1
1 
; (27)
where  
L
S
w S 

 1
S L (1 L)
1 S LSw
 
S 

 1
S S

L

wS

S
1 
+1 L
 
 1

S

wS

S
1 
+1 S
 
 1
. Thus, as trade becomes less restricted, eAop;L
and eAop;S increase (see lemma 2), and so does real income. Furthermore,
@

(YP )op
(YP )a

@S
=

(YP )op
(YP )a

(1  ) eA 1a;S eA 1a;L
 eA1 op;LeA1 a;L   eA1 op;SeA1 a;S

fPS f
P
L (1  L)
h
  @
@S
(1  S)
i
h
(1  L)fPL eA1 a;L +fPS (1  S) eA1 a;S i2 ;
with @
@S
= 
(
1+L
S
w S 

 1
S
1 S
S
 L
S
w S 

 1
S

S
+

1 

wS

S
1  1
wS

S
1 
S+1 S
)
< 0. Note that
eA1 op;LeA1 a;L  
eA1 op;SeA1 a;S > 0, which
follows from lemma 2, and 1   < 0. Thus,
@
24(YP )op
(YP )a
35
@S
< 0.
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